Right Attitudes

Don’t Ignore the Counterevidence

Left to themselves, much of our opinions and judgments are subjective, imprecise, incomplete, narrow-minded, or utterly unapprised.

A good critical-thinker deliberates objectively about alternative world-views that may cause him/her to philosophize differently. The English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill made an unparalleled case for this intellectual obligation in his treatise On Liberty (1859):

If the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one’s own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. … on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown, and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary’s case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination.

Mill recommends anticipating the potential objections to one’s argument, coming to terms with the merits of opposing points of view, and establishing why the balance of reasons still supports one’s viewpoints:

Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition; even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. … So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil’s advocate can conjure up.

Idea for Impact: Consider objections to your viewpoints; Remain open to alternative interpretations.

Suspend your inclinations and commitments and ask whether any of the objections have some force against your argument.

Don’t argue merely from those premises that appear compelling to you; address the premises that appear compelling to your opponent.

As Aristotle counseled, “The fool tells me his reasons; the wise man persuades me with my own.”

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